Tracking Oracle Database Binaries files changes

The Linux Audit system provides a way to determine the violator of the security policy and the actions they performed such as tracking malicious changes on the oracle executable.

Using Linux Audit system we can basically do the following activities :

  • Watching file access
  • Monitoring system calls
  • Recording commands run by a user
  • Recording security events

In this short blog post i will show how we can easily use it to catch changes in “./bin” directory.

Continue reading

Using LD_PRELOAD to implement a hidden trojan in an oracle database

In one of my previous post  i showed how we can inject a backdoor in an ORACLE database based on Dennis Yurichev findings.The described method required the modification of the oracle executable files.  Few days ago Rodrigo Jorge shared a blog post explaining how we can add another layer of security to the oracle binaries files to protect them against improper changes. That motivated me to check if i still can implement the hidden Trojan without modifying the oracle executable files ?

Continue reading

POUG : Memory access tracing slides

You know POUG ? Of course you know POUG ! This is one of the best  Oracle conference out there ! Great peoples ! Great Speakers ! Great Place ! Awesome ambiance !!!

Last week i was honored to be there ! It was a pleasure to meet many other Oracle geeks and to participate to this great event !



So as promised here is my presentation (My first public speak by the way)  on slide share : Just click here !

Many thanks for all the POUG Team for this great adventure ! Don’t miss POUG18 !!!!

CREATE ANY DIRECTORY threats : PDBs and the PATH_PREFIX clause

In my last blog post  “CREATE ANY DIRECTORY”=DBA=SYSDBA ! Ouch ! i talked about the potential threat that can represent the PREPROCESSOR feature introduced in oracle 11gr2 in a consolidated environment and how to develop a systemtap live patch to help preventing that.As Frank Pachot also stated a new parameter “PDB_OS_CREDENTIAL” was introduced in oracle which is meant to prevent that in CDB databases:

Continue reading


As Kamil Stawiarski explained in some great articles :

“A lot companies consolidates databases into one appliance – like for example Oracle Exadata. So you can have a lot of different databases in one physical cluster. And what if I tell you that you can execute any OS command as an oracle user, having just access to a database user with appropriate privileges? What if I tell you that DBA=SYSDBA? And not just SYSDBA for one database but for every database in a cluster?” Ref1

This is possible using only three elements thanks to the PREPROCESSOR feature introduced in oracle 11G   Ref2 :

Continue reading